Risk perception shapes individual behaviour, and is in turn shaped by the consequences of that behaviour.
Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) has classified HIV as a pandemic; the infection continues to spread in most nations, and is particularly prevalent in some of the worlds poorest nations [1] . Medical treatment has reduced annual rate of AIDS cases dramatically, however, the rate of new HIV infections has not dropped significantly [2] . Infection occurs by transfer of blood, semen, vaginal fluid, or breast milk [1] , but in many countries the primary mode of transmission is sexual contact. For example, it is estimated that in the United States, 80% of new HIV cases are a result of unprotected sex [3] . Much of this infection is driven by so-called "core groups" that are responsible for a disproportionate amount of infection, and can drive the epidemic in some populations [4] .
How individuals choose sexual partners and how they perceive their risk of infection within those partnerships appear to be major determinants of sexually risky behaviour as well as HIV infection risk [5, 6] . For example, in men who have sex with men (MSM), a lower perceived risk of infection within a partnership is correlated with a higher probability of engaging in unsafe sex [6] . Another study in MSM found that, although most HIV-positive males practiced safer sex with HIV-negative or HIV-status-unknown partners, having more lifetime male sexual partners was correlated with being more likely to practice unsafe sex with such partners [7] . Hence, risk perception, safe sex practices, and sexual partner selection are determinants of HIV transmission between sex partners [8] , and thus HIV prevalence in the population.
However, HIV prevalence in turn determines risk perception and sexual behaviour. For example, evidence from African HIV epidemics suggests that individuals adopt safer sex practices in response to rising HIV prevalence [9] . Individuals also appear to respond to how severe they expect HIV infection to be, with evidence that both HIV+ and HIV-individuals engage in more unprotected sex when anti-retroviral therapy (ART) is available; this occurs because ART causes HIV to be perceived to be more of a chronic disease than a fatal disease [10] . These findings highlight the feedback loop between risk perception and sexual partner selection/safe sex practices on the one hand, and HIV prevalence on the other hand:
when HIV prevalence is low, individuals perceive less infection risk and engage in riskier sexual behaviour, but that in turn can increase HIV prevalence. When HIV prevalence is high, individuals change their sexual behaviour to protect themselves.
In the field of behavioural epidemiology, models of behavioural influences on HIV transmission were some of the first to be developed. These approaches have analyzed, for example, the impact of contact patterns between various groups and other population heterogeneities, and how these factors interact with behavioural effects pertaining either to adherence to interventions or sexual behaviour, where behavioural change is either imposed through changes in a fixed parameter, or where it responds in a more fluid way to changes in HIV prevalence, as a model variable or a prevalence-dependent parameter [9, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] .
A few of these models have focussed specifically on the topic of sexual partner selection and how that influences HIV transmission [11, 18] . Game theory provides a very natural framework for addressing such topics [18] , since it allows individual preferences to be concisely described and provides a way of determining the collective outcomes of these individual-level strategic decision-making processes [21] (as opposed to modelling the effects of behaviour in a more phenomenological way, such as a functional form describing how the person-to-person transmission rate declines with increasing prevalence). However, it also requires assuming that individuals will maximize their expected utility given the preferences and likely actions of others. In the context of partner selection and HIV transmission, the 'game' is a sexual interaction between two partners, and the payoff is the utility outcome of a player's choice of unprotected or safe sex, given what they believe is the HIV status of their partner [18] .
In this paper, we develop an agent-based simulation model that extends a previous game theoretical model of sexual partner selection and HIV transmission [18] . Individual perception of HIV infection risk evolves a function of the individual's past sexual encounters, and individuals decide on either unprotected sex, protected sex, or no sex with the individuals with whom they are paired in each time step. Instead of exogenously imposing a pre-existing population structure where individuals engage in either high-risk or low-risk behaviour, our objective is to explore how distinct population groups-as defined by differing risk perception, HIV status, and sexual behaviours-can emerge from the coevolution of individual-level risk perception and HIV transmission, through partner selection games. We also wish to gain insight into potential mechanisms for how assortative sexual mixing with respect to level of 2 riskiness in sexual behaviour might emerge from this coevolutionary process.
Methods
The partner selection model is based on the dynamic signalling game described in Ref. [18] , except modifications are made regarding how individuals perceive their risk of HIV infection as a function of their encounters, and how this perception is carried into future rounds of the game. A game represents a strategic interaction between two or more individuals. A dynamic signalling game is a type of sequential game with two players passing signals back and forth [18, 21, 22] . The players may be of differing types. Only the sender knows his/her own type: the receiver observes the signal but not the type of the sender. The receiver proceeds to choose an action while updating their beliefs regarding the type of the other player.
Partner selection model
The population consists of N individuals forming a highly active core group population of MSM, such as the patrons of an urban bathhouse. The population is not structured with respect to age, gender, or other forms of social/cultural heterogeneity. In each round, individuals are paired at random to play a "Risky Sex Game". One of the pair is randomly assigned to be actor 1 (the initiator) and the other is assigned to be actor 2. The strategy of their partner, but they do not know with certainty and do not find out the truth, even if they eventually have sex (unless they become infected). This game will be embedded in an agent-based simulation model.
After being paired, the actors choose whether to play the Risky Sex Game with their partner with probability
where ρ(c) represents the probability that they will play the game, c represents the cumulative sex acts that have occurred between actor 1 and actor 2 until this point in time, and the "gregariousness" parameter ω controls the how the probability of the game being played depends on how often the actors have engaged in sex previously. Equation (1) partially captures the effect of learning and reputation. In our baseline analysis, we assume ω = 1, hence ρ = 1, but we explore ω < 1 in sensitivity analysis. If the actors decide not to play the game this round, they must wait until the next round of the game to be re-paired.
Should the actors decide to interact further, the game will commence as follows:
1. Actor 1 offers to have either protected sex (PS) or unprotected sex (US).
2. Actor 2 either accepts or makes a counter offer of PS or US.
Actor 1 either accepts final offer or ends the interaction with no sex (NS).
The decisions available to each individual in each step of the Risky Sex Game are depicted in Supplementary Figure 1 .
A utility is a value assigned to a possible outcome representing how an individual ranks their preferences. The utility U i for actor i of outcome k (k=US, PS, NS) when the HIV status of actor i is s i (s i =+, -) and the HIV status of actor j with whom they are paired is
where the utilities for various outcomes as they depend on HIV status follow the inequalities contained in Table 1 , which also contains the baseline utility values.
Because actors do not actually know the HIV status of their partner, each actor accrues an expected utility that depends on how strongly they believe their partner is HIV+. The 4 expected utility is a way of weighting utilities with an individuals inherent belief of HIV prevalence in the population, as represented by the b-value. The expected utility E i for actor i in a given round when the outcome is k is therefore given by
where b t is the probability with which actor i believes that their partner is HIV+, in the current round t of the game. With probability b t , actor i believes that their partner is HIV+ and hence actor i would receive utility U i (k, s i , +). Otherwise, actor i would receive utility
It is assumed that actors will maximize their personal expected utility.
The quantity b t is specific to each actor (agent), and varies over the course of the simulation 
where α is called the "historical influence parameter", since it measures how much of b t is from past encounters versus the current offer. If α is high, then actor 2's assessment of actor 1's HIV status is strongly dependent on the fact that actor 1 made an offer of unprotected sex, whereas if α is low, actor 1's offer had little impact on actor 2's evaluation of whether or not actor 1 is HIV+. On the other hand, if actor 1 offers PS, then actor 2 decreases his/her b-value according to
Actor 2 then evaluates their new expected utility from equation (3), using the updated value of b t , and responds to actor 1 with their own optimal outcome. If the two choices of outcome are in agreement, the actors will engage in that type of sex (US or PS). However, if they are in disagreement, Actor 1 will receive Actor 2's counter-proposal, and Actor 1 will update their b t value in the same way, using equations (4) and (5) depending on the counter-offer. Actor 1 then uses this updated b t value to determine their new expected utility, again according to equation (3) . If the optimal outcome for Actor 1 has changed and the actors are now in agreement, then they engage in that optimal choice of sex. If they remain in disagreement, then outcome is no sex (NS).
The value of b t is also updated between rounds, based on information the actors are assumed to be able to receive regarding the actual prevalence of HIV in their population.
This updating follows the equation
where I t is the prevalence of HIV in the population at the start of round t and β is the "local information" parameter governing the extent to which an actor's b t value is based on information from their interactions versus globally available, accurate information on HIV prevalence in their population. b t is the value a player carries into round t, based on their b t value at the end of the previous round t − 1 and how it has been modified through equation (6) inbetween rounds. For our baseline analysis we assume β = 1 and we explore β < 1 in sensitivity analysis. In general, we expect β to be close to 1 since the timescale of an HIV epidemic in a small core group population can be quite rapid [23, 24] . or greater than 1 were discarded. We chose a relatively small value for the initial b-value because recruited individuals in the model are assumed to be younger, and both the perceived prevalence of HIV in a population as well as the perceived risk of contacting HIV or other STI's are less in younger individuals [25] [26] [27] . Table 2 describes the different parameters used in the model and also provides their baseline values.
Transmission and natural history model
We assume a time scale on the order of a single HIV outbreak in a core group population.
Hence, we neglect recruitment and death, and assume a Susceptible-Infected (SI) natural his- Sex occurs between an HIV+ and an HIV-actor, then HIV is transmitted with probability τ = 0.01. For simplicity we assume Protected Sex is perfectly effective in preventing transmission [28] . The population size is N = 1000 players, with 5% of the population being infected at t = 0.
Results

Baseline scenario
The A stratification of outcomes by HIV status of actors provides more detail on how these two groups emerge and interact (Table 3 ). In the early stages of the outbreak when I(t)
is still small, the most common type of outcome for all three types of pairs is Unprotected As expected, HIV prevalence at the pseudo-equilibrium I and the average b-value b are insensitive to changes in the utility for protected sex, u P S (Figure 2 ), since changes in the range 0 < u P S < 100 do not impact the relative utility rankings (Table 1) . Increasing the transmission probability τ increases both the HIV prevalence at the pseudo-equilibrium as Figures 3,4) . This is robust to changes in α, u P S and τ (Supplementary Figures 5, 6 , Supplementary Table 1 ). We speculate that higher values of β close to 1 are most realistic, since low values of β correspond to having accurate information on global HIV prevalence on a weekly basis, which is not realistic for most populations. We also note that the rise in b , b− , and b+ is more gradual than the baseline scenario, indicating that Unprotected Sex will be preferred by both types for a longer amount of time.
Scenario ω < 1
Our baseline assumption is ω = 1, meaning that actors play the Risky Sex Game regardless of the previous sexual history of those they are paired with (Equation (1)). The divergence between b− and b+ persists when ω < 1, and I and b are likewise relatively unaffected (Supplementary Figures 7-9 ). The population still evolves into two groups characterized by divergent HIV status and sexual behaviour (Supplementary Table 2 ). The main impact of decreasing ω is to cause system evolution to slow down on account of a larger number of rejected pairings due to lack of a previous history between actors. However, long-term dynamics are unchanged. We expect larger values of c to apply in populations that are smaller, where individuals are more likely to be known to one another. 
Sensitivity analysis
We analyzed a variant of the model where individuals do not immediately know whether they have been infected, and only discover it if they are tested. Testing occurs with probability t per timestep and we assume 100% accuracy. HIV+ individuals only change their utility from HIV-to HIV+ once they become aware of their changed HIV status. When the testing probability t is sufficiently high, then the predictions of this variant model agree with those of the baseline model (Supplementary Figures 4, 5) . As t decreases, some differences begin to emerge: total HIV prevalence is higher when the testing probability is very low We assumed a population size of 1,000 because the number of clientele of a typical urban bathhouse is on this order of magnitude [29, 30] . However, we also experimented with varying N from 500 to 10,000, finding that model predictions are close to our baseline population of N = 1, 000 (the N = 5, 000 case is shown in Supplementary Figure 6 ).
We also conducted a probabilistic sensitivity analysis, where distributions are defined In at least one population, patterns of risk perception and sexual behaviour similar to those predicted by our model have been found. In a study of MSM in the United States, it was found that study participants with unrecognized HIV infection perceived themselves to have a low lifetime risk for acquiring HIV (i.e., they had low b-values), and also engaged in riskier sex [26] . This is consistent with our model prediction that HIV+ individuals have a lower perceived risk of being infected than HIV-individuals.
Because our objective was to identify a potential mechanism for how coevolution of risk perception and HIV transmission could lead to the emergence of groups, and because our focus was on a small, relatively homogeneous core group population over a relatively short timescale, we did not include important heterogeneities in transmission, population structure, or risk perception, although some of these could influence our results quantitatively or qualitatively. For example, we neglected age structure, gender structure, vital dynamics (birth and death) and the details of HIV natural history in infected hosts. Future work could explore whole-population models and also build greater realism into the decision-11 making process. Our assumption that each actor knows whether or not they carry HIV is an idealization; in fact, there may be a significant lag between contracting HIV and becoming aware of HIV status, even in industrialized countries [31] . However, we explored the impact of this assumption in sensitivity analysis.
The model predicted that, at the pseudo-equilibrium, unprotected sex will usually be practiced in HIV+/HIV+ pairs, and protected sex in HIV+/HIV-or HIV-/HIV-pairs. This mixing pattern is the outcome of our assumed mechanisms of interaction between risk perception, partner selection, and infection transmission. Similar patterns of assortative mixing are observed in real populations. We do not claim that such assortative mixing patterns are sufficiently explained by this mechanism, however, we hypothesize that this mechanism can contribute to these mixing patterns.
HIV prevalence is not the only determinant of an individual's perception of HIV infection risks, and many studies consider correlates for perceived risk such as gender, socioeconomic status and age, which are also influential. These previous studies are generally cross-sectional in nature, whereas longitudinal studies would be better suited to quantify factors of a dy- of an epidemic. This implies that risk perception is not a fixed, unchanging quantity that can be adequately described out of the context of HIV prevalence in the study population.
Rather, risk perception influences HIV prevalence, and HIV prevalence in turn influences risk perception, so that they form a single, coupled system. It is difficult for cross-sectional studies to capture this effect, which plays out over time. However, future longitudinal studies could test this by attempting to correlate perceived HIV infection risk with actual HIV prevalence at different time points in an HIV epidemic, as well as monitor how perception of personal risks and local or global HIV prevalence changes before and after infection with
HIV. This will become increasingly important as HIV vaccines become a reality over the next decade, since HIV vaccines might change how HIV infection risk and/or severity are perceived, and thus might change behaviour as well. We suggest that more attention needs to be given to this potential interaction, and more generally to the issue of the dynamics of core group formation and maintenance in the context of sexually-transmitted infections.
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